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The incipientfield of "law and emotion" has produced its first oeuvre,
The Passions of the Law, an eclectic and impressive collection of essays
edited by ProfessorSusan Bandes. In this Book Review, ProfessorLaura
Little examines this work, paying close attention to the quality of scholarship
on both sides of the "and," while noting the unusualstatus of emotion studies as an emerging discipline. Observing that much interdisciplinaryscholarship lacks an organized theoretical structure,ProfessorLittle identifles the
special challenges of law and emotion studies resultingfrom disagreements
within emotion theory itself She argues forcefully that law and emotion
scholarship would improve iforganized around theoretical debates within
emotion theory itself, such as scholarly dialogues on the definition of emotion
and its relation to cognition. However, she applauds the authors in The
Passions of Law for their broad-basedconception of law and society andfor
t Professor of Law, Temple UniversityJames E. Beasley School of Law. Many thanks
to Sharon McCullen and Chris Cerski, who provided excellent research assistance for the
review. Copyright 2001 held by Laura E. Little.
i-t Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law.
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strayingfrom more obvious analysis of issues in criminallaw to other legal

topics, such as adjudication, legal fonnalismn, and the origins of the law.
ProfessorLittle concludes that the law and emotion movement will be a we!come addition to thought in both disciplines and that The Passions of the

Law is a well- executed herald of this new scholarship.
INTRODUCTION

The emotions. They won't go away. In fact, from the academy's
vantage point, emotions and their influence on scholarly projects are
stronger than ever. Good thing, in my view. Emotions are so key to
the richness of life that no effort to understand humans and human
society could make any claim to accuracy or completeness without taking them into account. So it is that Susan Bandes's anthology of essays, The Passionsof Law,1 takes on the very crucial (albeit daunting)
task of exploring the intersection of law and emotion.
The challenge of such an endeavor is to fence in the relevant
territory for law and emotion study. The subject is so potentially limitless that any attempt to master it could easily become overabstract,
trivial, or empty of meaning. Magnifying this challenge, the threat of
overbreadth comes from both sides of the "law and emotion" equation. Scholars dedicated to the study of emotions cannot even agree
on how many emotions humans experience or how to catalogue them.

Likewise, the subject of law is like a storm cloud-amorphous, vast,
changeable, and impossible to grasp fully or to pin doun-thus adding yet another challenge to the enterprise of The Passions of Law.
By operating within the realm of particularity, Bandes's anthology
avoids several problems that could result from the vastness of its chosen subject matter. Indeed, most of the essays confine themselves to
exploring only one or a handful of emotions. Yet within this constrained universe, the anthology repeatedly rises to its illuminating potential. Skillfully assembled by Professor Bandes, the book is filled
with nugget after nugget of insight into human experience, and it
should successfully hook new participants into the enterprise of studying law and emotion.
To be sure, the book reflects some perennial problems with
anthologies in general and with interdisciplinary legal scholarship in
particular. Viewed through its individual pieces, the book is too insular, with each component insufficiently tied to the other components,
to theories of law, and to theories of emotion. Viewed as a whole, the
book is also too sweeping, with insufficient attention to the complexities of what constitutes law and what constitutes emotion. But even in
the face of these limitations, the high points of analysis in The Pas1 THE PAssiONs OF L.w (Susan A.Bandes ed., 1999) [hereinafter PAssioNs].
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sions of Law are so elegant and incisive as to make one experience
passion about law and legal scholarship.
I
LAw AND EMOTION: THE EMERGING MOVEMENT
Although many contemporary scholars have focused on what
humans do and do not know (rather than what they feel), an assortment of scholars have recently become increasingly interested in emotions. I hypothesize that the focus on emotions may result in part
from resurgent romanticism, with scholars growing weary of the disorienting effects of postmodernism. Others attribute the growing
mass of emotion literature to the greater prominence of psychology,
both inside and outside of the academy, as well as to the growing popularity of the view that knowledge does not derive from pure
2
rationality.

Whatever the genesis of the scholarly interest in emotions, legal
scholars have joined other academics in studying the many ways in

which emotion can touch law.3 Although most early efforts fell within
the ambit of "law and psychology" or "law and philosophy," recent
studies have resisted such cubbyholes. 4 Until the publication of The
Passions of Law, legal scholars did little to coordinate their study of
2 E.g., Ronald de Sousa, Emotion, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 270,
271 (Samuel Guttenplan ed., 1994) [hereinafter COMPANION] (attributing the rise in emotion study to the demise of Bayesian-derived economic models of rational decision and
agency); Paul Mattick, You've Got an Attitude, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2000, § 7 (Book Review),
at 28 (reviewing RICHARD WOLLEImM, ON THE EMOTIONS (1999)) (attributing rise in emotion study to growing importance of psychology studies and the "general conviction that
knowledge does represent the product of pure rationality").
3 Professor Bandes is one of the first to frame the study as "law and emotion." Scholars have already brought together law and psychology, law and psychiatry, and related disciplines. E.g., Charles Patrick Ewing, Introductionto PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHIATRY, AND rHlE Lv:
A CLINICAL AND FORENSIC HANDBOOK 1, 3 (Charles Patrick Ewing ed., 1985) (noting that
the purpose of the handbook is to assemble "many of the most recent and significant legal,
empirical, and clinical perspectives on the growing relationship of psychology and psychiatry to the law"); Roger D. Masters, NaturalisticApproaches to the Concept ofJustice: Perspectives
from PoliticalPhilosophy and Biology, 34 Am. BEHAV. Scmrns-r 289 (1991) (exploring concepts of justice through a comparison of western legal and political philosophy with research in the fields of evolutionary biology, economics, and game theory); James R.P.
Ogloff, Introduction to LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: THE BROADENING OF THE DISCIPLINE 1, 7
(James R.P. Ogloff ed., 1992) (recognizing law and psychology as an important subspeciality within both the law and psychology disciplines); Peter J. van Koppen et al., Preface to
LAWYERS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGISTS ON LAW, at iii, iii (PeterJ. van Koppen et al.
eds., 1988) [hereinafter LAWYERS ON PSYCHOLOGY] (demonstrating the delicate balance between law and psychology). The intersection of law and philosophy is even more traveled,
although the precise relationship between these two fields is difficult to articulate. See
Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinay Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law, 71 CfI.-Krr L.
REv. 909, 912 (1996) (elaborating on distinctions among philosophy, "philosophy-in-law,"
and legal philosophy).
4
See, e.g., Symposium, The Role of Forgiveness in the Law 27 FoRDHANI UP. LJ. 1351
(2000).
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law's intersection with emotion.5 Bandes herself catalogues numerous
works that analyze diverse emotions operating ithin legal contexts
spanning victim impact statements, definitions of illegality, structures
6
of punishment, and beyond.

Bandes also reports on the special challenges of integrating emotion study with law, given the law's traditional sentiment that emotions
are somehow inimical to rationality. 7 A long tradition in philosophy
and popular culture regards emotions as highly disreputable. Indeed,
the word "emotional" is often derogatory in intent.8 Given law's tradition of formality, neutrality, and impartiality, distaste of emotion is
magnified. As Bandes suggests, the place of emotions in law is "unruly, complex, and emotional." 9
Bandes wisely dismisses any suggestion that law and emotion are
somehow separable or incompatible.' 0 She is not alone in observing
that law often integrates emotion. Indeed, a measured contribution
to the anthology byJudge Richard Posner acknowledges the inevitable
and salutary results of emotion intersecting with lam." Make no mistake, though, Judge Posner insists that the ideal of the dispassionate,
principled decision maker mandates close policing of the connection
12
between law and emotion.
Bandes's attack on law's traditional distaste for emotion relies on
the synergy between law and emotion. In so doing, she draws on two
distinct benefits of emotion. First, Bandes suggests a deepening of
understanding and uplifting of spirit that one hopes will occur when
the legal thinker experiences feeling and thus banishes legal analysis's

5 See Richard H. Pildes, Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought, 90 Micat. L REx. 1520,
1524 (1992) (reviewing MARTHA C. Nussmw.ut, LoVE's KNowLEDGE (1990)) (observing that
"the nature of emotions and their relation to rational thought is an area legal scholarship
has just begun to explore"). After publication of The PassionsofLaw, Chicago-Kent ran a
symposium of articles that contained, ith var)ing degrees of overlap, other law and emo.
tion materials. Symposium, Law, Pydwog);, and the Emotiom, 74 Cti.-Kr-'.r L RE%,. 142-3

(2000).
6

See Susan A. Bandes, Introductionto PAssio%-s, supra note 1, at 1. 2-6.

7

Id at7.

8

Do 1e lad to Fel?, Titt.s LrrmAa, St:PiL. %tE.'r,
See, ag., Simon Blackburn, 1WtTy

Oct. 29, 1999, at 3,3 (reviewingJoNz ELsrm7t ALCHFtiE OF-THE MIND: RTION1.rIV A"NDTilE

(1999)) (noting that "[t]he emotions that really engage Alchemies are mainly
destructive: envy, jealousy, pride and vanity").
9 Bandes, supra note 6, at 2.
10 See id. at 7 (noting that "[t]he essays in this volume move beyond the debate about
whether emotion belongs in the law, accepting that emotional content is inevitable").
11 Richard A. Posner, Emotion Venma Emotionalism in Law, in P,%ssi.O-, supra note I, at
309.
12 See id. at 321 (arguing that "a number of the strongest emotions, such as anger,
disgust, indignation, and love, would be out of place because they would interfere ,ith the
problem-solving process.").
Fmo-roNs
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slavish quest for reason free of sentiment and warmth.15 Second,
Bandes argues that emotion actually improves law and decision making because "emotion in concert with cognition leads to truer perception and, ultimately, to better (more accurate, more moral, more just)
decisions."' 4 Punctuating these specific points, Bandes urges a more
general thesis: that law stands to learn much from scholars of emotion
theory in other disciplines.' 5
Having conducted multidisciplinary research for many years
(some of which dealt with the intersection of law and emotion), 16 I
approach Bandes's thesis with a strong positive bias. While mindful

of the pitfalls of interdisciplinary scholarship, I believe that critics too
readily overlook the importance of interdisciplinary research in understanding the seamlessness of life, promoting the advancement of
human understanding, and equipping humans with the means for
coping with a world of greater and greater complexity. In this age of
information explosion, the danger of knowledge fragmentation is
greater than ever. Thinkers have long commented on the ill effects of
this fragmentation. For example, Max Weber noted anomie or absence of spirit in intellectual specialists,' 7 Fyodor Dostoyevsky observed the remarkable blindness of scholars who analyzed parts and
overlooked the whole,' 8 and Jos6 Ortega y Gasset described the "barbarism of specialization."' 9 In the short run, the specialist risks becoming "hermetic and self-satisfied." 20 In the long run, knowledge
13
Bandes, supra note 6, at 7, 11; cf.Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature,and the Probhes of
Interdisciplinarity,108 YALE LJ. 1059, 1064 (1999) (observing that the law and literature
movement responds to the need for "moral uplift," which includes the need to educate
lawyers about moral judgments and forms of understanding that are emotional and
intuitive).
14
Bandes, supra note 6, at 7.

15

Id.

16

See, e.g., Laura E. Little, Envy andJealousy:A Study of Separationof Poiters andJudidal

Review, 52 HASMNGS LJ. 47 (2000) (analyzing the role of envy and jealousy in the Framers'
separation of powers jurisprudence); Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and FederalJurisdictionOpinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75 (1998) (presenting a study of the
sentiments possibly concealed in federal jurisdiction opinions); Laura E. Little, Loyalty,
Gratitude, and the FederalJudiciary, 44 AMi. U. L. REV. 699 (1995) (discussing the role of
certain emotions within federal judiciary's decision making).
17 See MAX WEBER, "Objectivity" in Social Science, in SOCIOLOGICAL WRITINGS 248, 248-49
(Wolf Heydebrand ed., Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch trans., 1994).
18
See FYODOR DosToEvsw, THE BROTHERS KARtANLzov 199 (David Magarshack trans.,
1967). Dostoyevsky's character Father Paissy expounds:
After a ruthless analysis the scholars of this world have left nothing of what
was held sacred before. But they have only investigated the parts and overlooked the whole, so much so that one cannot help being astonished at
their blindness. And so the whole remains standing before their eyes as
firm as ever and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.
Id.
19 Jost ORTEGA Y GAssEr, THE REVOLT OF THE MASSES 94-100 (Kenneth Moore ed.,
Anthony Kerrigan trans., 1985).
20

Id. at 98.
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threatens to become useless and human self-understanding lessens. 2 '
Society is less able to cope with challenges presented. Compartmentalization evokes T.S. Eliot's commentary on Dante's Inferno,2 in
which Eliot described hell as a place "where nothing connects with
23
nothing."
And so, as legal scholars, we must do our best to promote the
unity of knowledge. For that reason alone, Bandes's book deserves
high praise. However, because the project begins the auspicious task
of launching a new movement, it deserves close scrutiny. Under this
scrutiny-beyond the "mom and apple pie" thesis that lawyers can
learn from other disciplines-the project falters. The anthology's
most basic flaw flows from the lack of connection among the essays,
which, aside from Bandes's incisive introduction, have little glue to
hold them together. As the essays are now presented, one's fears are
not dispelled that the various contexts in which law and emotion intersect may be so wide ranging as to make any connection among
them elusive or nonexistent. In part this is simply a stylistic criticism.
Yet the deeper source of this criticism rests not in the writing or
editing of the anthology, but in the unformed nature of this new
movement. Without distinct form and coherence in the movement,
we are unable to evaluate Bandes's exciting yet largely untested assertion that law and legal process benefit from emotion because emotion
can actually improve perception.2 4 Only with a deeper, more coordinated understanding of both the law and the emotion sides of the
movement will we be able to test whether Bandes really has it right. In
this Review, I explore how both components of the pair "law and emotion" need development, with the aim of identifying how this important field may organize and mature in the future. I begin with the
right side of the and.
II

Ti RIGHT SInE OF THE AND: NEGOTIATING MANY THRE.ADs
OF EMOTION
Critics of interdisciplinary legal ("law and") scholarship often focus on shortcomings in understanding, analysis, and presentation of
21 Jos6 Ortega y Gasset describes the phenomenon as follows: "[The specialist] possesses a portion of something which, together with other portions of something not prhy
to him, constitutes knowledge.... The specialist 'knous' his own minimal corner of the
universe quite well. But he is radically ignorant of all the rest." Id.
22
SeeT. S. EuoT, THE WAsTE La-D 143 (Valerie Eliot ed., Harcourt BmceJavonovich,
Inc. 1971) ("I can connect/Nothing with nothing./The broken fingernails of dirty hands./
My people humble people who expect/Nothing.").
23
Vartan Gregorian, Keynote Address of the Fifv-Seventh JudirialConference of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 70 Tmw. L RE%. 1139, 1147 (1997).
24 See Bandes, supranote 6, at 7.
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the nonlegal discipline. 25 Allegations abound that legal thinkers exploring other disciplines lack rigor because they uncritically use
materials from other disciplines-appearing as undergraduates groping with half-familiar concepts and drawn by the glitter of big name
scholars from another field. This is not a problem in The Passions of
Law. The book's limitations derive not from any lack of sophistication
or unfamiliarity with the literature on emotion or other nonlegal
materials. In fact, over half of the anthology's fourteen contributors
have primary experience outside law, and some are themselves pathbreaking emotion scholars. 26 Although the anthology would have
benefitted from a contribution by scholars presently working with
neuroscience or psycho-physiology, even those contributors whose
home discipline is law exhibit extensive facility with emotion theory,
including psychological materials.
The anthology's limitations derive instead from relative silence
on how existing emotion scholarship is itself incomplete and unformed. Herein lies the unique challenge of law and emotion study:
not only must participants in this scholarship master more than one
area of academic knowledge, but at least half of the undertaking

probes a body of literature that is distinct, but not itself yet a discipline.2 7 Quite understandably the essays in the anthology do not portray any coherent view of human wisdom on emotion. Moreover, an
exhaustive survey of existing (albeit splintered) emotion scholarship is
clearly beyond the anthology's scope.
25 E.g., Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of HumanisticTheory in Law: Reexamining
the Assumptions ofInterdisciplinaryLegal Scholarship,41 DuKE LJ. 191, 193-94 (1991) (arguing
that legal scholars do not apply the appropriate standards, propagated within nonlegal
disciplines, when using authority from these disciplines); Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite"
in Modem American Constitutionalism,95 COLUM. L. REv. 523, 525 (1995) (discussing the
problem of constitutional "professionals" who make historical conclusions with insufficient
citation to primary and secondary historical sources). For a review of difficulties with interdisciplinary endeavors, see Jane B. Baron, InterdisciplinaryLegal Scholarship as GuiltyPleasure:
The Case of Law and Literature, in 2 LAW AND LiTERAruE: CuRRENT LEGAL ISSuES 1999, at 21,
21-39 (Michael Freeman & Andrew D.E. Lewis eds., 1999).
26 Contributors to the volume are: Danielle S. Allen, Susan A. Bandes, Cheshire Calhoun, John Deigh, Dan M. Kahan, Toni M. Massaro, William Ian Miller, Martha Minow,
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Martha C. Nussbaum, Samuel H. Pillsbury, Richard A. Posner, Austin
Sarat, and Robert C. Solomon.
27
See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 8, at 243 (observing that in light of disagreement among
specialists on emotion, "a nonspecialist must tread carefully"); O.H. GREEN, THE ENtol oNs:
A PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY 1-2 (1992) (observing intense disagreement among academics
seeking to understand emotions); Amflie Oksenberg Rorty, Introduction to EXPLAINING
EMOTIONS 1, 4 (Aminlie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980) [hereinafter EXPLAINING] (suggesting
that understanding of emotions is itself an interdisciplinary undertaking). For a discussion
of how this problem plagues many social sciences, see Edward L. Rubin, Law and the Methodology of Law, 1997 Wis. L. Rxv. 521, 555. Professor Rubin explains that "[w]ithin any
given social science field, different theories of causality contend with one another; this
produces lines of cumulative research that proceed on parallel paths, or occasionally run
headlong into each other, generating a considerable amount of confusion and debris." Id.
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The anthology does a masterful job of breaking the ice for the
development of a law and emotion movement. Nevertheless, scholarship will have a greater impact, and the understanding of both law
and emotion will more significantly advance, if those studying the intersection of law and emotion grapple directly and forthrightly with
the incipience of emotion scholarship itself. I expand this point, not
to undercut the excellent contributions in this volume, but to identify
possible areas for further study of law and emotion.
Of the shortcomings in emotion scholarship that affect understanding of law and emotion, I focus on two that have occupied the
centerpiece of dialogue among emotion scholars: the failure of thinkers to agree on a definition of emotion, and the lack of consensus on
the role of cognition in emotion. On the definitional issue, scholars
take widely different approaches, with taxonomies ranging from two
basic emotions to lists that include forty or more. The second shortcoming-concerning the relationship between cognition and emotion-is arguably not actually a deficiency in emotion theory, but
rather a frame for debate among those who have studied the phenomenon. The debate has its roots in the tendency of both Plato and
Aristotle to organize thought around cognition28 and was reignited in
earnest in the 1980s. 29 The emotion-cognition puzzle continues to
preoccupy many devoted to understanding emotion.3 0
A.

Many Threads of Emotion: Debates About Taxonomy and
Definition

For those scholars pursuing a taxonomic or definitional approach
to emotion study, their list making takes on one of two general approaches. The first approach identifies a few fundamental emotions
out of which other emotions generate.3 1 Those thinkers generating
longer lists tend to posit that each emotion includes some "irreducibly
specific component not compounded of anything simpler."32 Yet an
alternative approach identifies a broad continuum of emotions-each
composed of a finite collection of qualities. Under this view, a few
28

See Richard S. Lazarus, The Cognition-EmotionDebate:A Bit of Histoi, in I-xnaxooK OF

COGNITION AND EMoTION 3, 5 (Tim Dalgleish & Mick J. Power eds., 1999) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK].
29
See, e.g., RIB. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking. Preference Ned No Inferences, 35 '&1. PY

151 (1980) (questioning the then-prevalent assumption that affect is
postcognitive).
30 See, eg., ELsTFR, supranote 8, at 251 (noting controversy about the relation between
the cognitive antecedents and emotions themselves); Lazarus, supra note 28, at 3 (surveying the debate about the role of cognition in emotion through the lens of historical
context).
31 See de Sousa, supra note 2, at 270 (attributing the genesis of this model to
Descartes).
32 Id.
cHOLOGIsr
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basic attributes account for a rich variety of emotions. 33 These ap-

proaches yield widely varying lists. Aristotle, for example, provided at
least two lists which included as many as sixteen specific emotions and
two catchall categories. 34 Thomas Aquinas identified eleven basic passions, 35 and Augustine reduced his list to one (love).36 By contrast,
modem scholars have tended toward inflation, with a recent work
87
identifying forty-four emotions.
The taxonomy issue is not a battle just about what goes on the
list; the issue also goes to the core of what constitutes an emotion and
how emotions emerge and transform. Of course, these questions are
very much influenced by the emotion scholar's theoretical approach
(e.g., Freudian, evolutionary, or social constructionist). Thus, for example, a social constructionist may accept that numerous distinct
emotions exist, but would likely reject the hypothesis that emotions
can be explained and categorized by their ability to assist human
adaptive behavior in handling fundamental life tasks (such as fighting,
falling in love, and experiencing loss). 3 8 Superimposed on these varying theoretical approaches are other specific debates about the qualities that inhere in emotions; common ground is minimal, although

33
34

See id.
See IX AUSTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE WORKS OF AISTOTLE TRANSLATED IWrro
ENGLISH 1105a, 11. 21-24 (W.D. Ross ed. & trans., 1963) (listing eleven specific and two

broad categories: "appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred,
longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or
pain"). In Rhetoric, Aristotle discusses the following states: anger and mildness, love and
hatred, fear and confidence, shame and esteem, kindness and unkindness, pity and indignation, envy and emulation, pleasure at the deserved misfortune of another, and contempt. XI AISTOTLE, Rhetorica, in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE TRANSLATED INTO ENGLIS1
1378a, 1. 31 to 1 38 8 b, 1.31 (W.D. Ross ed., W. Rhys Roberts trans., 1963); see also ELs-flt,
supranote 8, at 61 (summarizing the discussions of emotion in Aristotle's NicomacheanEtl.
ics and Rhetoric); SUSAN JAMES, PASSION AND ACTION: THE EMOTIONS IN SEVENTEENTII-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY 5 (1997) (same).
35 SeeJAmEs, supra note 34, at 6 (discussing Aquinas's classification of basic passions).
36 See id. at 114-15 (describing Augustine's analysis of passions as aspects or modes of
love); Blackburn, supra note 8, at 3 (stating that Augustine "managed with only one"
emotion).
37 See ELSTER, supranote 8, at 443 (listing forty-four "specific" emotions in the index).
Some modern scholars try to reduce their lists by identifying families of emotion.

For

example, Paul Ekman provides the following list of emotion families, each including a
number of related emotions: "amusement, anger, contempt, contentment, disgust, embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, pride in achievement, relief, sadness/distress, satisfaction, sensory pleasure, and shame." Paul Ekman, BasicEmotions, in HANDBOOK, supra note
28, at 45, 55. Most modern lists tend to include "anger, fear, jealousy, and especially intense forms of love." Cheshire Calhoun & Robert C. Solomon, Introduction to WHAT Is AN
EMOION? CLASSICAL READINGS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 23 (Cheshire Calhoun &
Robert C. Solomon eds., 1984) [hereinafter EMOTION].
38 See, e.g., Ekman, supra note 37, at 46 (describing social constructionist literature on
emotion).
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thinkers generally agree that emotions "feel" like something and have
fairly specific physiological expressions.3 9
Phenomena sometimes distinguished from emotion include

moods (e.g., sadness-which has no object), attitudes (e.g., contempt-which has no point in time when something is "felt"), desires
(e.g., hunger-which can be based on the pure biological needs of
nourishment and survival), and beliefs (e.g., opinions-which tend to
dissipate in the face of contrary evidence). 40 In a leading work, Robert C. Solomon elaborated on a taxonomy structure that divides passions into emotions, moods, and desires. 41 According to Solomon,
emotions focus on particular objects and situations, whereas moods
focus on the world as a whole.4 2 Recognizing the distinction is a bit
slippery, Solomon acknowledges that sometimes emotions concentrate on objects and situations that are quite general. 4 3 He maintains
that the distinction beuveen desires and emotions is even more prob44
lematic because many desires are built on the structure of emotions.
He explains, however, that "[d] esires convert mere 'things' into goals
and instruments, mere 'facts' into conquests and frustrations, mere

'possibilities' into ambitions, wishes, and hopes."45

Typical of this field, other scholars take an entirely different approach than Solomon and like-minded thinkers. Some thinkers are

interested in breaking down (rather than clarifying) any distinctions

among emotions and other interpretive or motivational states.46 A
contemporary scholar representing yet another tack ision Elster, who
both distinguishes and builds analytical bridges among emotions and
39 Blackburn, supra note 8, at 4; see also, eg., Wowun.M, supra note 2, at 12-15
(describing the relationship among emotion, belief, and desire); Ekmnan, supranote 37, at
46 (listing qualities of emotions).
40 See ROBERT C. SOLOMON, THE PAssIoNs 132-34 (1976) (discussing moods and
desires); WoLuLFm, supra note 2, at 13 (defining beliefs); Blackburn, supra note 8, at 3-4
(discussing moods and attitudes).
41 See SoLomoN, supra note 40, at 132-34; see also Robert C. Solomon, Justice v,.
Vengeance7 On Law and the Satisfaction of Emotion, in PAssIONs, supra note 1, at 123, 124 (distinguishing between emotions and desires in the context of characterizing vengeance).
42 SOLOMON, supra note 40, at 133. But seejohn Deigh, Cognitivism in the Theory of
Emotions, 104 ETmcs 824, 826 (1994) (arguing that not all emotions have intentional objects and that some cognitivists get around this observation by "excluding experiences of
objectless emotions from the class of emotions proper and placing them in some distinct
class of mental states, such as moods").
43 SoL.omsON, supra note 40, at 133.
44 Id. at 134.
45 Id. at 132-33.
46 See, eg., Michael Stocker, IntellectualDesire, Emotion, and Action, in ExPLmAuiNc, supra
note 27, at 323 (arguing that sharp distinctions among emotions and other psychological
states disserve good intellectual life and work); Gareth Matthews, Ritual and the Rigious
Feelings, in EXPLAINING, supra note 27, at 339 (investigating the interplay among emotion,
belief, thought, and behavior through the lens of religious ritual); see also Calhoun & Solomon, supra note 37, at 6 (explaining that Errol Bedford andJean-Paul Sartre saw emotions
as dosely related to other mental phenomena such as judgments or beliefs).
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other psychological states. In a recent work, Elster approvingly sur-7
veyed prior taxonomies for studying and understanding emotions,
and also showed how the boundaries among emotions can break

down-explaining, for example, how the human psychological process transforms shameful or dysfunctional emotions into those
48
deemed more constructive or acceptable.

So it is that even in the process of delineating the qualities of
emotions, such disagreement and diversity in approach emerge that
one emotion scholar has remarked that the academy's "understanding
of emotions is in almost singular disarray, so that even if we could

frame a coherent explanatory account of basic cognitive concepts,...
no such account of emotions could be provided." 49 In her introduc-

tion to The Passionsof Law, Susan Bandes reckons with these problems
of definition and characterization. 50 Forthrightly acknowledging that
no consensus exists on what constitutes an emotion, Bandes queries
"whether this particular discussion-on emotion's role in the lawcan proceed despite the lack of definition."5 1
Most other contributions to The PassionsofLaw sidestep this question, treating their chosen emotion as unquestionably meriting that
label. 52 In a closing essay on emotion in the opinions ofJustices John
Marshall Harlan and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Samuel H. Pillsbury astutely observes the tendency of legal writers "to treat emotion terms as
self-defined and as normatively obvious."53 Noting that emotion theorists pursue diverse approaches to defining emotion, Pillsbury does
not see this indeterminacy as an obstacle to exploring "emotive influ54
ence on judicial decision making."
Although I agree that the problem of defining emotions should
not disqualify the study of law and emotions, I am more troubled by
the ramifications for a thriving law and emotion movement. By directly reckoning with the definitional problem, law and emotion
scholars might not only benefit from integrating the debate into their
writing, but might also contribute to creating a consensus definition
of emotion. Equally important, explicit discussion of the definitional
47
48

EiSrER, supra note 8, at 52-107.
See id. at 332-70.

49

GREEN,

50

See Bandes, supra note 6, at 10.
Id.

51

supra note 27, at 1-2.

52 Many contributions to the volume do, however, survey more general tleoretical
approaches to the "emotion" they analyze. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Institutions and Emo-

tions: RedressingMass Violence, in PASSIONS, supra note 1, at 265, 272-74 (summarizing the

description of five approaches to understanding emotions from prior work by Cheshire
Calhoun and Robert Solomon).
53 Samuel H. Pillsbury, Harlan, Holmes, and the Passions ofJustice, in PASSIONS, supra
note 1, at 330, 331.
54 Id. at 331-32.
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problem will provide a common thread, binding what is now a series
of uncoordinated efforts in law and emotion scholarship, which does
not fall together as a coherent whole. Without clarification of the issue, one is left wondering what ties together a group of work such as
the essays here other than the word "passion" in the title. After all,
the essays grapple with such diverse phenomena as disgust, 55 shame,rr
remorse, 57 revenge, 58 love, 5 9 forgiveness,6 0 and cowardliness. 61
The anthology's essays on disgust are instructive of how debates
about defining emotion can enhance the law and emotion movement.
In two potent and elegantly written entries, Martha Nussbaum and
Dan Kahan open The Passions of Law with dueling arguments on
whether disgust has a legitimate role in governance by law.62 (Nussbaum thinks not, Kahan thinks yes. 6 3) The passages are particularly
well chosen, having the quality of majority and dissenting opinions in
a close case (both of which convince the reader of the rightness of
their views). One would nevertheless be in a better position to evaluate their merits if the essays presented direct analysis of how and why
the specific concept of "disgust" fits in with existing literature on what
constitutes an emotion. 64
If, for example, one subscribes to the view that emotions are part
of a subtle continuum, one might be less likely to condemn disgust for
all legal purposes, given the possibility that disgust might be related to
or confused with a more salutary phenomenon such as outrage or indignation. 65 Similarly, one might be less likely to embrace Nussbaum's unqualified rejection of disgust if one believed the sentiment
was capable of transmogrification into a more positive social force-a
55

See Martha C. Nussbaum, "Secret Sewers of VWce": Disgust, Bodies, and the Law,in PASsupra note 1, at 19.
56 See Toni M. Massaro, Show (Some) Emotions, in PAssio.s, supra note 1, at 80.
57 See Austin Sarat, Remorse,Responsibilij, and CriminalPunishment:An Analsis of Popular Culture, in PAssIoNs, supranote 1, at 168.
58 SeeJeffiie G. Murphy, Moral Epistemologp, The Redibukie Emotions, and the "Clumsy
SIONS,

Moral Philosophy" ofJesus Chris4 in PASSIONs, supra note 1, at 149; Solomon, supra note 41.
-9 See Cheshire Calhoun, Afaking Up EmotionalPeople:The Case of Romantic Lore,in PAssioN s, supra note 1, at 217.

60
61

See Minow, supra note 52.
See %iflliam Ian Miller, Fear,l1Mak Iegs, and Running Away: A Soldiers Story, in PAs.

sioNs, supra note 1, at 241.
62 See Dan M. Kahan, The ProgressiveAppropriationof Disgust, in PAssio.-s, supra note 1.

at 63; Nussbaum, supra note 55, at 19-62.
63 See Kahan, supra note 62, at 63; Nussbaum, supra note 55, at 22.
64 Cf Nussbaum, supra note 55, at 43 (rejecting the ,iew that disgust is a "moral sentiment that should be honored as highly relevant to... legal regulation"). In fairness, I

note that Nussbaum's entry explicitly engages with the other debates within the scholarship that I discuss below-the intersection of emotion uith cognition. Sre id. at 26.
65 Nussbaum argues that disgust works in collaboration with e~il, is unlike more worthy emotions such as outrage and indignation, and should therefore not be used to guide
public action. See id.at 22, 26-29, 29-35, 49-55.
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process Jon Elster observes that allows humans to make lemonade
from sour lemons (rather than sour grapes from sweet ones). 0
Existing emotion theory would also assist in evaluating Kahan's
position. Kahan presents a generally favorable portrait of William

Miller's thesis that disgust is indispensable for members of society in
making moral judgments and mapping social organizations. 67 In connection with this later notion, Kahan argues that disgust is remarkably
hardy--persisting within social groups "notwithstanding shifts in social norms. '68 To deny this, Kahan maintains, is to engage in selfdelusion, which in turn can promote lack of candor and accuracy
69
within legal process.
Evaluating this argument in light of the definitional literature,
one might look at the work of one prominent emotion theorist who
maintains that disgust merits a place on the list of emotions because it
possesses several characteristics of basic emotions, including brief duration and "unbidden occurrence" (that is, the onset of the emotion is
involuntary or unchosen).70 This approach yields nlixed reviews for
Kahan's claims. Obviously, Kahan's claim that disgust is persistent
conflicts with the notion that it lasts only briefly. On the other hand,
emotion theory's suggestion that disgust is an involuntary phenomenon reinforces Kahan's view that human governance cannot take
place without the influence of disgust. Although Kahan's arguments
ring true to me, I take no final position about whether he accurately
represents the qualities of disgust. I urge only that his arguments, and
others like them, would benefit from scrutiny in light of debates
within emotion theory. This would put the legal angle (as well as the
emotion theory itself) into sharper focus 71 and would provide a
72
shared dialogue for law and emotion scholarship.
66

See EL.SER, supra note 8, at ix.

See Kahan, supra note 62, at 64-69 (evaluating in a favorable light the theses that
disgust is both an "indispensable member of our moral vocabulary" and a constitutive fea67

ture of hierarchies necessary for social order).
68
69
70

Id. at 69.

Id. at 73.
See Ekman, supra note 37, at 54-55.
71 I, of course, use Kahan and Nussbaum only as examples. Many other contributors
to the volume would similarly benefit from expanding on the definitional or taxonomic
issues underlying their analyses. As a contrasting example, take Jeffrie G.Murphy's contribution, for which further discussion of the qualities and distinctions among emotions
would be instructive. See Murphy, supra note 58. Murphy's piece evaluates the claim thatin the context of retributive punishment-some emotions are epistemically reliable (such
as guilt), while others are epistemically unreliable (such as malice, spite, and envy). Id. at
150.
72
An example of how this common ground could illuminate the scholarship here
arises from a comparison of the contributions of Cheshire Calhoun and William Ian Miller.
Calhoun's essay describes how the law's position on same-sex marriage is tied to society's
conception of romantic love. Calhoun, supra note 59, at 217-18. Miller's essay explores
how a statute outlawing cowardice expresses disapproval of fear. See Miller, supra note 61,
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THE TANGLE OF LAW AND EMOTION
Many Threads of Emotion: Debates About Cognitive Content

The Passions of Law has much more to say about the other topic
preoccupying emotion theorists: the relationship between cognition
and emotion. Because this relationship implicates notions of rationality, the relationship's appearance in a volume on law is not surprising.
Indeed, because law is conventionally associated with rationality and
traditionally uncomfortable with emotionality, I argue that further law
and emotion study should concentrate more explicitly on debates
about the cognitive content of emotions.
Like emotion, the concept of cognition defies easy definition.
Making matters worse, the cognition/emotion debate begs the question of what constitutes an emotion. In fact, much work on defining
emotions proceeds by reference to parallel definitions of cognition.7
Some approaches to defining emotions use differences in "cognitive
focus" as the means of organizing and distinguishing emotions.7 4
Thus, the technical materials sometimes take the appearance of a cat
chasing its tail, with the uninitiated reader left with no apparent way
out of the emotion/cognition circle. Do we start with a definition of
cognition or with a definition of emotion?
One toehold for escaping the tautology comes from a simple dictionary definition of cognition: "'the action or faculty of knowing. ' "7 5
One scholar expands this for philosophers of the mind, including in
this concept "sensation, perception, conception, etc., as distinguished
76
from feeling and volition."
Once they reach beyond the definitional dilemma, thinkers divide the emotion/cognition relationship in a variety of w-ays. One of
the many angles on the question involves examining the role of emotions in structuring frameworks for judgments of reasonableness and
explaining the physiological process of obtaining knowledge (i.e.,
learning). 7 One popular approach views emotions as reactions to
at 242-43. After reading these two excellent essays, I ias dogged ith curiosity about their
approaches to how society constructs emotions. Is fear socially constructed in the same way
as homosexual love? Does understanding why society is not yet able to recognize homosexual love shed light on how we ensure courage in our soldiers?
73 See, e.g., Lazarus, supranote 28 (outlining some of the approaches to defining emotion and cognition and inserting another function-motivation-as an integral part of
mental process).
74 See, e.g., Gerald L Clore, 1gyEnotionsRequire Cognition, in THE NATLME OF E.nOTnox
181, 186-90 (Paul Ekman & RichardJ. Davidson eds., 1994) (delineating three broad classes of emotions distinguished in terms of the cognitive focus involved").

75 Alan Garnham, Cognitive Psychology, in CoMP, i.%., supra note 2, at 167, 167 (quoting Oxford English Dictionary definition of "cognition"). On the prudence of indulging I
less-than-certain starting definition for analysis, see Deigh, supra note 42, at 826-27 (arguing that inaccuracies are not always "an overdraft," but can be "a loan that the theory needs
to get started and is certain to repay if it prospers").
76
Garnham, supra note 75, at 167.
77 See de Sousa, supra note 2, at 271-72.
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cognitive states such as beliefs and desires. According to this approach, the emotion of anger, for example, can be a response to the
78
belief that one has been insulted.
Beyond the foundational concepts of desires and beliefs, controversy emerges. The following example is illustrative. According to
conventional theory, one could say that the emotion of fear is a response to my belief that a lion is coming at me. 79 Analytical complication arises when one realizes that my psychological state (and
conclusion that my safety is in jeopardy) results at least in part from
my belief that lions are dangerous. Emotion theories diverge in delineating what part of the notion "lions are dangerous" is emotion and
what part is cognition or knowledge.80 Some adopt a one-way explanation: I experience fear because of my belief that lions are dangerous. Other theories describe a "bidirectional" network, with emotion
and cognition building on each other: my belief in the danger of lions
feeds my fear and my fear in turn reinforces my belief.,, Some psychiatrists and psychologists have pressed this bidirectional theory further,
outlining a "complex dynamical system. '8 2 Under this system, my fear
of lions derives from a complex of associations, inferences and interpretations that call on cognitive processes as well as affect or feeling.
Representing a related integrated approach, philosopher Richard
Wollheim recently explained that emotions exist alongside beliefs
(which provide humans with an understanding of the world) and
desires (which motivate humans to act in the world),83 Wollheim
maintains that emotions arise as positive or negative attitudes about
84
what humans experience as having satisfied or frustrated a desire.
Woliheim would argue that my fear of lions arises from my perception
of the dangers they pose and in turn gives rise to my aversion or desire

78 William Lyons, The Philosophy of Cognition and Emotion, in HANDBOOK, supra note 28,
at 21, 39. Martha Minow provides a useful review of this approach in her contribution to
The Passions of Law on institutions for redressing mass violence. See Minow, supra note 52,
at 272-76.
79

See RONAIZ

80

See id.; see also Calhoun & Solomon, supra note 37, at 4 (explaining that determin-

DE SOuSA, THE RATIONALIY OF EMOTION

40-41 (1987).

ing the precise connection between emotion and belief has become a focal point of controversy); Deigh, supra note 42, at 834-35 (exploring the ramifications of the observation
.one need only believe that something is a threat to fear it" ).
81 Joseph P. Forgas, Network Theories and Beyond, in HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 591,
592; cf.Cheshire Calhoun, Cognitive Emotions?, in EMOTON, supra note 37, at 327, 342
("[E]motions do go hand in hand with typical beliefs. But this is not because emotions are
beliefs. It is because ordinarily we believe that things are as they seem.").
82
Marc D. Lewis & Isabela Granic, Sef-Organization of Cognition-EmotionInteractions,in
HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 683, 68385.
83
See WOLLENmI, supra note 2, at 11-15.
84 See id. at 1-68 (outlining relationship among belief, desire, and emotions).
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to avoid them. In other words: "danger lies on the interface between
85
desire and fear."
The usefulness of these theories for understanding and improv-

ing law and legal process is limitless. Many of the essays in tie anthology bear out this promise. Indeed, John Deigh's contribution to the
anthology takes the emotion/cognition debate as his starting point in
arguing that understanding the emotional bond between the law and
its subjects is crucial to the sovereign and representative capacities of
law. 8 6 Likewise, Robert C. Solomon invokes the cognition materials in
condemning the false distinction between "stupid" emotions and "rational" responses (such as retribution) and in arguing that "one purpose of law is to rationalize and satisfy the most powerful social
passions."8 7 Echoing similar themes, Martha Minow makes substantial
use of material on cognitive aspects of emotion in evaluating appropriate institutional responses to mass violence, 8 as doesJudge Posner
in his more general piece on distinctions between emotions and
emotionalism.8 9
Yet further explanatory potential exists in the interstices of the
emotion theorists' debates. For example, some thinkers who impute
considerable cognitive content to emotions identify emotions ith
evaluative judgments. 90 Others suggest that emotions combine essentially evaluative judgments with other phenomena such as "agitated
states of mind, autonomic behavior such as perspiration and goose
flesh, and impulses to action."9 1 Still others raise the specter of an
entirely groundless emotion in which the subject reacts to an object
without evaluating it.92 Under this view, I could fear a lion without
93
even thinking that it threatens harm.
While law will not necessarily provide the tool for resolving these
theoretical inconsistencies, the debates hold several lessons for law.

First, for all of their differences on the precise roles of feeling and
85

Id. at 64.

86

SeeJohn Deigh, Emotion and the Authori y of La,: Variation on Themes in Bentham and

Austin, in PASSIONs, supra note 1, at 285, 287-89.
87 Solomon, supra note 41, at 131.
88
89

See Minow, supra note 52, at 272-76.
Posner, supra note 11, at 310-16, 323. Martha Nussbaum's entry also discusses the

intersection of emotion with cognition. See Nussbaum, supra note 55, at 26.
90
E.g., NUSsBAUM, supranote 5, at at 292 (defending view that emotion is "identical
with the full acceptance of, or recognition of, a belief"); SOLoMON, sufpra note 40, at 186-87
(explaining that "[alan emotion is a (set of) judgment(s) which constitute our world, our
surreality, and its 'intentional objects'").
91
Deigh, supranote 42, at 836; see also, eg., PATRicA S. GREE.sp. , F-%tO'roNs & RE,%
soNs: AN INQUIRY INTO EiOTxoNALJuSmicATroN 15-17 (1988) (noting irrational emotional
responses that undermine the view that emotions must involve evaluative judgments).
92 E.g., Deigh, supra note 42, at 837.
93
See id. ("Couldn't a garter snake ... fill one ith fear ithout one even thinking
that it threatens harm?").
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cognition, the various materials demonstrate that reason and knowledge-two functions of the mind that law prizes so dearly-actually
require emotion for their existence and meaning. This revelation
helps dispel law's self-defeating fear of emotion. Second, discussion
of the differences among cognitive theories provides an opportunity
to bring together diverse legal concepts. This alone merits explicit
treatment of the debates in future law and emotion studies. Moreover-if we are lucky-increased coherence in the emotion theory and
deeper understanding of the legal principles may also result as byproducts of explicit discussion.
I illustrate this potential with three essays in The Passions of Law
that analyze the emotion of empathy.9 4 Arguing that empathy is important to good judging, Judge Posner marshals more positive attention to empathy than other contributors. Highlighting empathy's
useful qualities, he reasons:
Empathy is one of the best examples of the cognitive character of
emotion. The cognitive element of empathy is imagining the situation of another person; the affective element, which marks it as an
emotion and not merely a dimension of rationality, is feeling the
emotional state engendered in that person by his situation.95
From this premise, Posner reasons that empathy enables a judge to
integrate into her decision-making remote human interests that are
not immediately before the judge, but possibly affected substantially
by any decision the judge makes. 96 Posner's praise of empathy is not
without qualification, 97 perhaps because of his earlier, less favorable
reviews of the emotion. 98 Here, however, Posner emphasizes empathy's potently cognitive character in the hands of an able judge. He
suggests that the emotion more likely reflects an evaluation of beliefs,
rather than an ungrounded emotional reaction that short-circuits
reasoning.99
94 Samuel H. PiUsbury includes related discussion about sympathy in his analysis of
dissents by Justices Harlan and Holmes. See Pillsbury, supra note 53, at 344-57, For a discussion of the distinctions between sympathy and empathy as they relate to law, see Justin
D'Arms, Empathy and Evaluative Inquiry, 74 Cui.-KENT L. REV. 1467, 1477-82 (2000).
95 Posner, supra note 11, at 329 n.21.
96 Id. at 323-24.
97 See id. at 324.
98

See RICHARD A. POSER, OVERCOMING LAW 381 (1995) (asserting that "the internal

perspective-the putting oneself in the other person's shoes-that is achieved by the exercise of empathetic imagination lacks normative significance").
99 SeePosner, supranote 11, at 324. Those committed to economic analysis of law may
be pleased by his submission that such analysis is "profoundly empathic" because it integrates into decision-making the interests of absent parties. Id. I query, however, whether
economic analysis truely includes the afterglow of feeling that Posner describes as crucial
to the emotional component of empathy. For further law and emotion scholarship related to the economic analysis of law, see Anne C. Dailey, The Hidden Economy of the Unconscious, 74 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 1599 (2000).
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This discussion contrasts with Susan Bandes's treatment of empathy in her introduction. Bandes, who has written about empathy in
the context of victim impact statements,10

0

states:

The empathy that serves as an important tool for therapists does not
easily translate into a necessarily positive emotional tool for legal
actors, such asjudges. The goals ofjudging are not necessarily consonant with the goals of therapy. The judge... seeks not just to
understand but to pass judgment.1 0 '
What accounts for the difference in tone here? Bandes and Posner
diverge in evaluating empathy's efficacy in decision making. Does this
derive merely from difference in context or in how they define the
emotion? 0 2 Do Bandes and Posner possess contrasting views on the
cognitive components of empathy, or is Posner merely highlighting
the upsides and Bandes highlighting the downsides of the same
0 3
phenomenon?
The Bandes and Posner analyses provide foils for evaluating arguments about remorse reflected in Austin Sarat's contribution to The
Passions of Law.'0 4 While Sarat's primary aim is to describe popular
culture's portrayal of remorse,10 5 he also submits a more normative
argument that remorse is a precondition for a criminal's acceptance
of responsibility and reconciliation with victims and society.' 0 G In so
doing, he suggests that remorse contains empathetic components,
with the criminal identifying with the victim: "'Remorse ... implies a
degree of empathetic pain on the part of the one who has caused the
fracture.'' 0 7 This empathetic quality, however, eludes characteriza-

tion in light of the materials on cognition. On one hand, Sarat outlines a process of growth-from committing a criminal deed,
accepting responsibility for the deed, and reconciling with society100

See eg., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narratie, and Vidim inpad StatementU, 63 U. C11. L

REv. 361, 377-79 (1996) (endorsing efforts to achieve imaginative understanding of others,

yet warning that empathy can merely perpetuate the status quo when it is used to emboss a
judge's own preconscious response onto the circumstances of others); cf Donald C.
Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essay for Lawyer, 74 CHi.-KFr-," L RPEv 1569, 1569,
1573-77 (2000) (highlighting the tendency of individuals to embrace their own beliefs and
viewpoints with more confidence than they should).
101 Bandes, supra note 6, at 9.
102
See Bandes, supra note 100, at 373 (noting that empathy is "laden with serious definitional problems" and that the "conceptual utility of empathy varies uidely depending on
the context in which it is invoked").
103 Bandes argues that decision making cannot occur without "selective empathy."
Bandes, supra note 6, at 6.

See Sarat, supra note 57.
Id at 170-71.
Id at 169, 177-85.
107 Id at 169 (alteration in original) (quoting Harvey Cox, Repentance and Forgirnes=A
ChristianPerspective, in REPETANcE: A Co PA
PRSPECIVE 21, 24 (Amatai Etzioni &
David E. Camey eds., 1997)).
104
105
106
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that strongly suggests a cognitive process tethered to rationality, akin
to Posner's account of empathy. Yet Sarat's picture of the empathetic
components of remorse has an impulsive, physiological character as
well. Not only does he label empathy as painful, 0 8 but he also opines
that "[t]he remorseful criminal joins us in our shock"10 9 and that the
criminal's "remorse does not diminish... the astonishment [the criminal act] engenders.""10 This textured portrayal of remorse and empathy is reinforced in his intriguing (if somewhat oblique) statement
that "remorse... does not challenge reason but seems instead to be a
reasonable/rational response to transgression."'1
Sarat apparently sees the "feeling" component of empathy as es2
sential to bridge-building among criminals, victims, and society." If
that is the case, Sarat values this "feeling" of empathy as most crucial
to law and the legal process-a view that contrasts with the views of
Posner and Bandes. No matter which thinker has characterized the
emotion most accurately, all three expose the shallowness of law's
knee-jerk aversion to emotion. The three essays each contain important insights about the complex structure of empathy and its ability to
operate differently in different "legal" contexts-whether harnessing
remorse to complement the more formal aspects of the criminal process, improving legal doctrine, or heightening the accuracy of adjudication. The emotion/cognition thread has in turn provided a means
to understand how the three diverse approaches to law and legal
scholarship intersect. To the extent this discussion about law, empathy, and other emotions continues within the context of the emotion/
cognition debate, we stand to benefit.
III

THE LEFT SIDE OF THE AND: NEGOTIATING MANw THREADS
OF LAW

Scholars have recently noted problems with interdisciplinary
1 13
scholarship's failure to develop a nuanced understanding of law.
Like those pointing to legal scholars' unsophisticated use of other disciplines, these critics focus on the shallowness of interdisciplinary
scholarship. Again, however, The Passionsof Law dodges this criticism
by representing the law in a textured and multicontextual manner.
108

109
110

Ml

Id at 178.
Id.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 169.

Cf id. at 178 ("Remorse builds a bridge between offender and the community astonished by his deed.").
113 E.g., Baron, supra note 13, at 1061 (arguing that "[]aw-and-literature scholarship
has not questioned what the category 'law' consists of and has thus tended inadvertently to
reinforce the notion of law as autonomous").
112
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The broad variety and deep understanding of law reflected in the
anthology is, no doubt, the wise editorial design of Susan Bandes.
This quality, however, goes largely unheralded in the book. As with
the book's treatment of emotion theory, the essays are not explicit
about how their slice of law relates to the whole. As a consequence,
the depth of understanding they represent go unappreciated. Consequently, future law and emotion scholarship would benefit from a
more self-conscious approach that articulates where the piece of life
under scrutiny lies in the undelineated territory of law, culture, and
1 14
society.
Although the anthology's essays say little about how they view law,
they actually span myriad manifestations of law.11 5 For purposes of
discussion, I catalogue the essays into three categories: creating and
modifying legal doctrine, structuring legal institutions, and umpiring
the intersection of legal rules, culture, and society. 'With an eye toward highlighting the contribution of the book and mapping a route
for future scholarship, I discuss each category in turn.
A. Many Threads of Law: Legal Doctrine
The anthology's coverage of legal doctrine is both predictable
and surprising. Predictable is the prevalence of criminal law matters,
including essays on disgust, vengeance, punishment, retribution, cowardice crimes, hate crimes, remorse, and human rights atrocities.1 16
Convention may dictate this focus on criminal law. Criminal law has
often touched emotion, sometimes providing a safe haven for emotion within the social order, identifying which emotions act as valid
defenses to crime, indulging the impulse to punish, and occasionally
restraining emotional reaction to crime in the name of civility and
rationality. Despite criminal law's status as a traditional medium for
emotion in law, some of the criminal law essays in the volume bear
unconventional results. Indeed, many of the criminal law essays reach
beyond a vision of law as a formal, autonomous institution, investigat114
In observing that this territory is undelineated, I envision some limitation on what
constitutes "law." Othenise, asJ.M. Balkin points out, the investigation of how emotion
study touches law would simply be described as "law" rather than "law and emotion." &e
J.M. Balkin, Interdisdplinarityas Colonization, 53 AV:sH. & LEE L REx,. 949, 950 (1996) (observing that "there is 'interdisciplinarity,' rather than 'disciplinarity,' and that this interdisciplinarity is expressed as 'law and,' rather than just 'law.'").
115 See, e.g., Deigh, supra note 86, at 287-89 (developingiurisprudential theories); Minow, supranote 52, at 265, 272-76 (structuring institutions); Nussbaum, supra note 55, at 22
(developing legal doctrine); Posner, supranote 11, at 309, 310-16, 323 (structuring institutions); Solomon, supra note 41, at 131, 133 (developing jurisprudential theories).
116
This is not the first effort to demonstrate the dominance of criminal law in law and
emotion scholarship. See ag., L4wttns on PsyctIOm-omw supra note 3 (anthology of interdisciplinary works including anal)sis of sentencing, criminal intent, rape trials, and prison
personnel).
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ing such matters as the depiction of crimes in popular culture, 117 the
use of law to justify social passions,"18 and the manipulation of emotions to ensure compliance with the criminal law.119
Surprising is the relative absence of one area of doctrine often
used to control and to indulge emotion: family law. Only Cheshire
Calhoun-in an incisive social constructionist account of same-sex
marriage-makes more than passing reference to how emotion theory
could help structure family law rules. 120 Think of the rich possibilities
awaiting further scholarship: emotion theory could help fashion doctrine that harnesses the most constructive emotions, identifies beneficial cognitive components of feeling/belief/desire interactions, and
encourages negative emotions to transform into those that improve
family relationships.
Civil remedies doctrine provides another obvious candidate for
emotion theory research. Theoretical boundaries need not stretch in
order for emotion theory to help fine-tune doctrines governing the
availability of injunctive relief (e.g., how should a court deciding
whether to issue an injunction evaluate the plaintiff's alleged fear of
imminent harm?), declaratory relief (e.g., does the defendant require
the coercive strong-arm of contempt or will she comply with a mere
declaration of legal rights?), restitution (e.g., how much profit disgorgement will deter a defendant from acting on future impulse for
illegality?), compensation (e.g., how do we measure pain and suffering?), and punitive damages (e.g., does an understanding of remorse,
retribution, disgust, and vengeance in the criminal setting translate to
punitive civil remedies?).1 2 1 Trusts and estates, property, and contract
law also stand to benefit from emotion theory, although the formality
characteristic of these areas may initially hinder integration of cognitive lessons from emotion theory.
B. Many Threads of Law: Structuring Legal Institutions
Of all the essays in The Passionsof Law, Martha Minow's contribu122
tion discusses emotion in institutional structure most explicitly.
Surveying triggers for negative emotions and the role of emotions in
negotiating social relationships, Minow outlines alternatives for reSee Sarat, supra note 57.
See Solomon, supranote 41.
119 See Massaro, supra note 56.
120 See Calhoun, supra note 59; see also Bandes, supra note 6, at 6 (referring to bitter
divorce litigants); Minow, supranote 52, at 271, 273-74 (referring to no-fault divorce and
how "go for broke" strategies in conventional divorce litigation undermine relationships).
121 Cf, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence,Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort
Law, 74 CHi.-KErNr L. REv. 1431, 1435 (2000) (analyzing the role of emotion in evaluating
juries' authority in determining tort liability).
122
See Minow, supra note 52.
117
118
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dressing mass violence.1 2 3 In so doing, she provides an important
sketch of how emotion theory helps us evaluate the efficacy of conven12 4 Fotional litigation and alternative dispute resolution techniques.
cusing largely on the perspectives of parties (victim and perpetrator),
Minow describes how society and individuals pursue the task of identifying an instrument for restoring victims, acknowledging injustice,
and forging stronger communities.'
The balance of the book's structural discussion focuses less on
emotions of affected citizens than on the emotions of government
agents staffing institutions. In particular, the process of adjudication

(usually in the dominant legal institution of courts) garners the attention of several contributors. In addition to discussing victim impact
statements considered by criminal juries, contributors focus on the
consciousness of judges, performing content review of opinions as
well as surveying theories on how emotions influence decision
making.
Several commentators explain how emotional guides improve judicial decision making. Undergirding many of the works in The Passions of Law is the relatively uncontroversial proposition that emotion
(at least controlled emotion) improves perception, which in turn improves decision making. 12 6 More specifically, Samuel H. Pillsbury suggests that good judging results when a judge possesses an emotional
attachment or passion about ideas and abstract concepts because she
will more likely embrace those concepts even in the face of "profes12 7
sional and personal obloquy."
In an entirely different argument, Judge Posner submits that
much of law embodies a moral code reflecting inarticulable emotions
rather than formalistic reasoning.12 8 Since he maintains that "it is not
the proper business of judges to dismantle the moral code of their
society," Judge Posner concludes that ajudge's emotional reactions to
an issue provide a valuable shortcut in efficient decision making.'"
He supports this claim with his description of the salutary effects of
empathy, 3 0 adding that indignation, which provides a shorthand for
society's moral condemnation of certain acts, is another useful emo13
tion for adjudication. '
123 Id. at 266-71.
124
125

See Ud. at 272-77.
See i. at 266.

126 See, eg., Bandes, supra note 6, at 7 ("[E]motion in concert uith cognition leads to
truer perception and... better ... decisions.").
127 Pillsbury, supra note 53, at 332-33.
128 Posner, supra note 11, at 322.
129 Id. at 322-23.
130 See id. at 323-25.
131

See i& at 322.
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Judge Posner's remarks suggest a number of directions for future
research. One particularly promising connection implicates recently
reignited debates among legal scholars on the merits of formalism in
decision making. By formalism, I refer to the jurisprudential approach to law characterized by adherence to norms without searching
evaluation of the goals the norms are meant to achieve. 132 Modem
proponents enunciate a number of virtues of formalism, including restraint, efficiency, reduction in error, and consistency in decision making.'3 3 Interestingly, these qualities parallel many of the same benefits
Judge Posner identifies in empathy and indignation, qualities he con34
trasts with formalistic reasoning.
As juxtaposition of these two lines of argument suggests, formal
legal thinking's aversion to emotion holds some irony. Antipathy to
emotions forgets that they can actually act as handservants to formalism. Not only do some emotions aid in adjudicating with consistency
as Judge Posner suggests, 13 5 but awareness of emotions can help legal
actors achieve the type of clearheadedness presumably valued by formalism's focus on rules.
Given the synergy between law and emotion, unqualified condemnation of emotion does not serve formality. At the same time,
critics of formalism may find aid and comfort in the law and emotion
enterprise. In observing the possibilities for healing and resolution
made possible by remorse in the criminal process, Austin Sarat observes the violence that can be done by "fidelity to rules," which can
"short-circuit . . .judgment" and undermine 'justice in individual
36
cases."1
Another direction suggested by Judge Posner's remarks concern
perspectivalism and debates about subjectivity in adjudication. His observation that empathy enables judges to consider perspectives of interested parties not before the court is reminiscent of works on
postmodemism and competing points of view. For many decades legal scholars have struggled with the unavoidability of competing view132 Larry Alexander, "With Me, It's
All er Nuthin': Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U.
CHI. L. REv. 530, 531 n.2 (1999); see also Richard H. Pildes, Formsof Formalism,66 U. Ciit. L.
REv. 607, 612-17 (1999) (identifying several forms of formalism, including "apurposive

rule-following").
133
See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULEs: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND INLIFE 158-59 (1991) (arguing that formalism
reduces factors that may be legitimately used to resolve disputes); Alexander, supra note
132, at 534 (arguing that formalism makes possible coordination and efficiency in decision
making); Pildes, supra note 132, at 613 (critiquing another commentator's view that formalism reduces error in decision making and ensures deference "to the greater expertise
of rulemakers as against rule appliers").
134 See Posner, supra note 11, at 322-23.
135 See id. at 322-24.
136 Sarat, supra note 57, at 174.
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points and the judge's challenge of integrating those viewpoints into
conflict resolution.' 3 7 Emotion theory has much to contribute to this
struggle, particularly through the light it sheds on subjectivity.
Most sophisticated thinkers reject the view that because emotions
are subjective, they reflect nothing but the specific consciousness of
the individual experiencing them. Rejecting the view that subjectivity
is coextensive with point of view, emotion theorists recognize that
while emotional states are perspectival, this "need not bar them from
being cognitive or playing a role in cognition."'13 Understanding how
an essentially subjective phenomenon such as emotion relates to a
cognitive function such as developing beliefs can surely assist an adjudicator in understanding and considering perspectives of those interested in the outcome of a dispute.
Law and emotion studies also implicate a related issue in adjudication theory: judicial candor. While some scholars adopt a nuanced
(sometimes utilitarian) view of the merits and demerits of candor,
most recognize its importance in maintaining judicial integrity, educating the public and governmental actors about the meaning of the
law, and fulfilling ajudge's duty to litigation parties.' 3 9 The Passionsof
Law contributes its own angle, with many essayists grappling ith the
wisdom of ajudge being candid about her own emotional reaction to
a particular case. Some scholars, such as Posner and Nussbaum, suggest that full emotional disclosure may validate emotions such as anger, hatred, or disgust, whose legitimacy in dispute resolution is
137
See, e.g., PATRiCIAJ. Witrws, THE ALCHEMY OF R,%CE AND RGi'rrs 149-50 (1991)
(describing the inevitability of competing perspectives); Laura E. Little, Charaderizationand

Legal Discourse, 46J. LEGAL EDLc. 372, 375-80 (1996) (describing the creation of different
characterizations of one set of facts); Martha Minow, The Suprne Court, 19S6 Tma--Farword.JusticeEgendered,101 HAv. L Rx. 10, 70 (1987) (suggesting that one should reach
beyond the assumption of "one reality" to accept that "[t]here is no neutrality, no escape
from choice"); see also Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yu.x LJ. 1601, 1626-28
(1986) (recognizing that no judge acts alone, outside social context).
138
de Sousa, supra note 2, at 271; see, e.g., Klaus R. Scherer, Appraisal Thron,, in {-l _t.
BOOK, supranote 28, at 637, 637 (explaining that appraisal theory maintains that "emotions
are elicited and differentiated on the basis of a person's subjective evaluation or appraisal
of the personal significance of a situation, object, or event").
139 See, eg., Robert A. Leflar, HonestJudidalOpinions,74 Nw. U. L R-x. 721,737 (1979)
(contending that the function ofjudicial opinions is to "compel the writingjudge and his
colleagues to understand what they are deciding and why, and to provide the parties and
their counsel with the same information" (footnote omitted)); Laura E. Little, An Excursion
into the Uncharted Waters of the Seventeenth Amendment, 64 TLir_. L RE%-. 629, 657 (1991)
(arguing that full discussion of arguments on both sides of an issue serves to ensure that
judicial opinions best fulfill their role of guiding future courts and litigants); Martha L
Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passionfor Justice, 10 ,umozo L RE%. 37, 54-55 (1988)
(urging the importance of a full statement of reasons for decision); David L Shapiro, In
Defense ofJudicial Candor, 100 HAnv. L REx,. 731, 741-42 (1987) (commenting on tncertainty flowing from lack of candor). For qualifications to an uncritical call for judicial
candor, see Scott Altman, Beyond Candor,89 Mlici. L REx. 296 (1990), and Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Tlwory ofJudicial Candor,73 TF'X. L RE%,. 1307 (1995).
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suspect. 140 Others, such as Kahan, are more fearful of incomplete disclosure. Kahan criticizes the attempt to mute disgust, calling it selfdelusion, which can transform judicial opinions and public reaction
to them into obstacles to justice. 141
The Passions of Law carefully analyzes another topic that loosely
relates to the task of structuring institutions: identifying and reinforcing sources of law's authority. For organizational purposes, I discuss
this immediately below as a question pertaining to culture, critique,
and social change. Many other structural issues, however, await attention by those interested in law and emotion. Some topics that would
likely lend themselves to ready analysis in light of emotion theory include identifying appropriate emotions held by nonadjudicatory governmental actors (such as legislators and executive branch
officials), 142 developing techniques for helping litigants understand
and cope with emotions at play in a particular dispute, and evaluating
recent experiments with therapeutic justice. 143
C. Many Threads of Law: Culture and Society
Those wishing to understand the nature of law likely benefit from
tracing the roots or sources of law's authority. As recent work in law
and society reveals, this quest for the source of authority uncovers
meaningful insights into the relationship among law, culture, and social order. The contributions to The Passions of Law expose an important role for emotion in this complex tangle of relationships. In the
process of negotiating this tangle, the essays collectively present a
broad picture of how law fully permeates society.
John Deigh's contribution contends that "the authority of law is
conditioned on an emotional bond between the law and its subjects. ' 144 After surveying how this view relates to the theories of Bentham, Rawls, Hart, and others, Deigh explains that the authority of law
comes not only from the subjects' (admittedly emotional) vulnerabilSee Nussbaum, supra note 55, at 26-55; Posner, supra note 11, at 313-19, 321.
See Kahan, supra note 62, at 69-73. Arguing powerfully that humans (presumably
human judges included) must embrace moral humility, Murphy also contributes to arguments in favor ofjudicial candor. See Murphy, supra note 58, at 160-61.
142
For an example of scholarship analyzing emotions in executive decision making,
see Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation of Executive Clemency, 74
CHi.-KENT L. REV. 1501 (2000).
143
Beyond this, the possibilities for using emotion theory to enhance and critique
therapeutic justice are vast, though somewhat indistinct. See, e.g., DENNIS P. STOLLE ET AL,,
PRACTICING THERAPEUTICJURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION (2000) (discussing
diverse matters including restorative justice, holistic lawyering, and alternative dispute resolution). I refer most particularly to innovations such as drug courts and dependency
courts. See, e.g., Hon. Peggy Fulton Hora et al., TherapeuticJurisprudenceand the Drg Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the CriminalJustice System's Response to Drug Abuse and
140
141

Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 439 (1999).
144

Deigh, supra note 86, at 287.
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ity to punitive sanctions, but from their independent wvillingness to be
governed by law, "to subordinate their own ends to the ends the Ia
sets for them." 145 He likens law's authority over its subjects to parents'
authority over their offspring: both children and lav's subjects reach
beyond fear of punishment to develop respect for the authority, as
well as personal identity (or self-definition) and conscience. 146
Several commentators provide specific examples of this theme integrating law, emotion, social control, and personal identity. Toni
Massaro describes social mechanisms that can manipulate emotions
such as shame to ensure compliance with lav. t4 From a different
perspective, Austin Sarat shows how remorse can complement the legal process in confronting criminal acts and promoting healing in so148
cial relations injured through criminality.

In his study of vengeance, Robert C. Solomon joins Saint and

Massaro in demonstrating how society harnesses emotions in order to
complement or invigorate law. 149 In particular, Solomon argues that
by accommodating vengeance, the law performs an important "cleansing" function. 150 But Solomon avoids reducing the relationship to a

one-way street in which emotion reinforces law. Instead, he describes
a complicated dynamic by which law and society cultivate, rationalize,
15 1
and satisfy emotions as well.
This dynamic of law, society, and culture is vividly portrayed in
Cheshire Calhoun's account of same-sex marriage1 2 Calhoun starts
with the proposition that legal doctrine most often condemns samesex marriage using a definitional argument-asserting the notion that
145

Id. at 295.

146
147

See id. at 295-96.
See Massaro, supra note 56.

See Sarat, supra note 57.
SeeSolomon, supra note 41. Danielle Allen presents a similar theme in arguing that
unease about the law's justification for punishment stems from ignorance about how punishment is related to failed relations among members of a community and society's need to
restore disturbed relationships. See Danielle S. Allen, Democratic Dis.case: Of Anger and the
TroublingNature of Punishment, in PAssIONs, supra note 1, at 191, 191-94.
150 Solomon, supra note 41, at 129, 131, 140-44.
151 See it. at 126-44. For other current work on emotions and social control, seeJeffrey
J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CL-HKENr L RE'. 1537 (2000). In addition,
Solomon's analysis suggests interesting intersections ith legal literature about tie educative aspects of law and psycho-physiologist literature on the crucial role of emotion in
148
149

learning. See, e.g.,Jim Chen, Law as a Spedes of Language Acquisition, 73 W.sii. U. LQ. 1263
(1995) (exploring law, linguistics, and learning); de Sousa, supra note 2, at 271 (obsering
that humans do not learn unless the limbic s)stem-the brain part "most actively implicated
in emotional states-is stimulated at the time of learning" (citing Ism%i SaImu.un, Ix
PRAISE OF CoGcrrnm Emo-noNs (1991))).
152
See Calhoun, supranote 59. Austin Sarat's contribution also provides an important
account of the interplay of a specific emotion (remorse) in culture, substantive legal principles, and legal process. See Sarat, supra note 57.
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marriage necessarily requires one man and one woman.15 3 What accounts, she asks, for this stalwart, ipso facto, yet weak, approach? She
ultimately finds an explanation in "the cultural construction of a particular emotion: romantic love."1 54 In persuasively establishing the social architecture for romantic love, Calhoun identifies matters such as
the individuals whom society disqualifies from experiencing the emotion (e.g., children), 155 the tendency of romantic movies to end with
the "promissory note of a blissful future" between two perfectly compatible persons, 156 and constitutional law's occasional treatment of
the marriage bedroom as a sacred place-where sex that is more than
mere sex takes place.' 5 7 Contrasting this evidence with constnctions

of "loveless homosexuality," Calhoun demonstrates how recognizing
same-sex marriage would make conceivable what culture, myth, law,
and social institutions have made inconceivable: romantic love outside
the context of a two-gender, permanent, stable partnership.,'
Calhoun thus traces how culture (as partially constituted by law
and reinforced by a background of social norms, relationships, and
beliefs) creates an emotion (romantic love) that lays at the root of a
cultural construction (marriage). The cultural construction of marriage in turn feeds the social policies behind law (condemnation of
homosexuality), which themselves influence the structure of legal doctrine itself (only one man and one woman can comprise a valid marriage). This is stunning legal analysis. Whether or not as legal
scholars we should be surprised that one whose primary discipline is
not law has developed these insights, it is clear that through continued discussion of the interplay among emotion, society, and culture
that Calhoun outlines, we stand to learn much about law, and perhaps
one day we may be able to chart its boundaries.
CONCLUSION

Scholars frequently criticize "law and" scholarship for its lack of
an organized theoretical structure or a defined body of knowledge.1 5 '153

Calhoun, supranote 59, at 217.
Id. at 218.
155 Id. at 224.
156
Id. at 226.
157
Id. at 227-28.
158 See id. at 230-36.
159 See, e.g., Baron, supra note 13, at 1062 (observing that the law and literature movement is so fractured that the phrase "law and literature" leads some to dismiss the move154

ment as "an empty vessel, a phrase devoid of content"); Annelise Riles, RepresentingInBetween: Law, Anthropology, and the Rhetoric of Interdisciplinarity,1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 597, 598
n.1 (noting that "sociology of lav as a field of study has not produced an integrated and
inclusive body of knowledge" (quoting RitaJ. Simon &James P,Lynch, The Sociology of Law:
Where We Have Been and Where We Might Be Going 23 Lw & Soc'v REv. 825, 843 (1989))).
See generally Charles NV. Collier, InterdisciplinaryLegal Scholarship in Search of a Paradigm,42
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No doubt this phenomenon results inevitably from the large number
of participants and random selection of interests pursued as part of

interdisciplinary scholarship. 60 Yet the law and emotion movement
may be specially poised to avoid some of the incoherence plaguing
other "law and" movements. As a new development, law and emotion
stands to benefit from the considerable body of literature critiquing
the paths taken by other interdisciplinary legal movements. Some of
that literature even suggests that interdisciplinary legal scholarship allied with social science (such as psychology) benefits greatly from the
self-discipline and theoretical precision required of social science
methodology. 16 1 Ironically, law and emotion scholarship may also
benefit from its greatest obstacle: the incipience of emotion theory
itself. As both the law and emotion movement and emotion theory
develop simultaneously, special opportunities for integration and coordination will likely present themselves. Only through explicit dialogue about the limitations in emotion theory and the
multidimensional qualities of law in society, however, will interdisciplinary scholars make the most of these opportunities. Susan Bandes's
The Passions of Law does a wonderful job selling its subject matter.
What is needed now is a coordinated effort to fulfill its promise.

DuKE LJ. 840 (1993) (arguing that interdisciplinary legal scholarship hs never confronted
its foundational and methodological problems).
160
Cf.JAxMs GLxjcK, CHAOS: NMIANG A NEv ScENcE 145 (1987) (noting that scientists
maintain that relationships among three or more bodies in a system are "most often impossible" to predict).
161
See, ag.,Jonathan R. Macey, Law and the Sodal Sdences 21 HR,. J.L & PU'a. Poi.'v
171, 17-75 (1997) (arguing that the focus required on particular theories and resulting
self-discipline makes law and social science projects more credible than other "law and"
interdisciplinary approaches); see also Robert C. Ellickson, The Marde for "Law-and" colarship, 21 HARV.J.L & PuB. PoL'Y 157, 159, 170 (1997) (arguing that the market for legal
scholarship has fostered an increase of social science work among legal scholars and that
the market for legal scholarship "works passably well"); Rubin, supra note 27, at 539-40, 553
(noting that the social science methodology of verification has escaped the significant
criticism aimed at social science grand theory and that social science is the 'discipline to
which legal scholars should turn").
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